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A Robust Circle-criterion Observer-based Estimator for Discrete-time
Nonlinear Systems in the Presence of Sensor Attacks and Measurement
Noise
Tianci Yang, Carlos Murguia, Margreta Kuijper, Dragan Nesˇic´
Abstract— We address the problem of robust state estimation
and attack isolation for a class of discrete-time nonlinear
systems with positive-slope nonlinearities under (potentially
unbounded) sensor attacks and measurement noise. We con-
sider the case when a subset of sensors is subject to additive
false data injection attacks. Using a bank of circle-criterion
observers, each observer leading to an Input-to-State Stable
(ISS) estimation error, we propose a estimator that provides
robust estimates of the system state in spite of sensor attacks
and measurement noise; and an algorithm for detecting and
isolating sensor attacks. Our results make use of the ISS
property of the observers to check whether the trajectories
of observers are consistent with the attack-free trajectories of
the system. Simulations results are presented to illustrate the
performance of the results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networked Control Systems (NCSs) have emerged as
a technology that combines control, communication, and
computation and offers the necessary flexibility to meet new
demands in distributed and large scale systems. Recently,
security of NCSs has become an important issue as wireless
communication networks might serve as new access points
for attackers to adversely affect the operation of the system
dynamics. Cyber-physical attacks on NCSs have caused sub-
stantial damage to a number of physical processes. One of the
most well-known examples is the attack on Maroochy Shire
Councils sewage control system in Queensland, Australia
that happened in January 2000. The attacker hacked into
the controllers that activate and deactivate valves and caused
flooding of the grounds of a hotel, a park, and a river with a
million liters of sewage. Another incident is the very recent
SuxNet virus that targeted Siemens supervisory control and
data acquisition systems which are used in many industrial
processes. It follows that strategic mechanisms to identify
and deal with attacks on NCSs are strongly needed.
In [1]- [22], a range of topics related to security of control
systems have been discussed. In general, they provide analy-
sis tools for quantifying the performance degradation induced
by different classes of attacks; and propose reaction strategies
to identify and counter their effect on the system dynamics.
Most of the existing work, however, has considered control
systems with linear dynamics, although in most engineering
applications the dynamics of the plants being monitored
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and controlled is highly nonlinear. There are some results
addressing the nonlinear case though. In [23], exploiting
sensor redundancy, the authors address the problem of sensor
attack detection and state estimation for uniformly observ-
able continuous-time nonlinear systems. Similarly, in [24],
the authors provide an algorithm for isolating sensor attacks
for a class of discrete-time nonlinear systems with bounded
measurement noise.
In this manuscript, we consider the case when the system
has p sensors, all of which are subject to measurement
noise and up to q < p/2 of them are attacked. Following
the results in [25] for linear systems, using a bank of
circle criterion observers [26]- [29], each observer leading
to an ISS estimation error, we construct an estimator that
provides robust estimates of the system state in spite of
sensor attacks. In particular, the proposed estimator leads to
estimation errors satisfying an ISS property with respect to
measurement noise but independent of attack signals. Next,
we propose an algorithm for detecting and isolating false
data injection sensor attacks. Our results make use of the ISS
property of the observers to check whether the trajectories
of observers are consistent with the attack-free trajectories of
the system. The main idea behind our results is the following.
Each observer in the bank is driven by a different subset
of sensors. Thus, without attacks, the observers produce
ISS estimation errors with respect to measurement noise
only. For every pair of observers in the bank, we compute
the largest difference between their estimates. If a pair of
observers is driven by a subset of attack-free sensors, then
the largest difference between their estimates is also ISS with
respect to measurement noise only. However, if there are
attacks on some of the sensors, the observers driven by those
sensors might produce larger differences than the attack-free
ones. These ideas work well under the assumption that less
than p/2 sensors are attacked, i.e, q < p/2. To design the
observers in the bank, we give an extension to the result
in [28] for designing robust discrete-time circle-criterion
observers. In particular, we use the incremental multiplier
technique introduced in [29] to cast the observer design as
the solution of a semidefinite program. We minimize the ISS-
gain from the measurement noise to the estimation error.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
preliminary results needed for the subsequent sections. In
Section III, we provide tools for designing optimal robust
circle criterion observers in the attack-free case. In Section
IV, assuming that a sufficiently small number of sensors are
subject to attacks, we propose an estimation scheme using
a bank of robust circle criterion observers. In Section V, an
algorithm for isolating sensor attacks is given. Finally, in
Section VI, we give concluding remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
We denote the set of real numbers by R, the set of natural
numbers by N , the set of integers by Z, and Rn×m the set of
n×m matrices for anym,n ∈ N. For any vector v ∈ Rn, we
denote vJ the stacking of all vi, i ∈ J and J ⊂ {1, · · · , n},
|v| =
√
v⊤v and supp(v) = {i ∈ {1, · · · , n} |vi 6= 0}. For a
sequence of vectors {v(k)}∞k=0, we denote v[0,k] a sequence
of vectors v(i), i = 0, · · · , k, ||v||∞ , supk≥0 |v(k)| and
||v||T , sup0≤k≤T |v(k)|. We say a sequence {v(k)} ∈ l∞
if ||v||∞ < ∞. We denote the cardinality of a set S as
card(S). We denote matrix P to be positive definite as
P > 0. The identity matrix is denoted by I . A function
β : R≥0 × R≥0 → R≥0 is said to be of class exp −KL if
there exist c > 0, λ ∈ (0, 1), such that β(s, k) = cλk · s.
The binomial coefficient is denoted as
(
a
b
)
, where a, b are
nonnegative integers. We denote a variable m uniformly
distributed in the interval (a, b) as m ∼ U(a, b).
B. Definitions and lemmas
Several definitions and lemmas that are important in this
paper are introduced here.
Definition 1: [29] (Incremental Multiplier Matrices).
Suppose f : Rnq → Rnf . A symmetric matrix M ∈
R
(nq+nf )×(nq+nf ) is an incremental multiplier matrix
(δMM) for f if the following incremental quadratic con-
straint (δQC) is satisfied for all q1, q2 ∈ Rnq :[△q
△f
]T
M
[△q
△f
]
≥ 0, (1)
where △q = q1 − q2 and △f = f(q1)− f(q2).
Definition 2: Consider a discrete-time system
e+ = F (e,m), (2)
with state e ∈ Rn, the input m ∈ Rp with {m(k)} ∈ l∞.
The system is said to be input-to-state stable (ISS) with a
linear gain γ and an exp−KL function if there exist c > 0,
λ ∈ (0, 1), and γ ≥ 0 such that the following condition is
satisfied:
|e(k)| ≤ cλk|e(0)|+ γ||m||k, (3)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn, k ≥ 0, and {m(k)} ∈ l∞.
The next lemma provides sufficient conditions for system (2)
to be ISS with a linear gain γ and an exp −KL function.
It is a special case of the lemma in [29].
Lemma 1: [29] Let c1, c2 > 0, c3 ∈ (0, 1) and µ1 > 0.
Suppose there exists V : Rn → R≥0 such that
c1|e|2 ≤ V (e) ≤ c2|e|2, (4)
V (F (e,m))− V (e) ≤ −c3V (e) + c3µ1|m|2, (5)
for all k ≥ 0, e ∈ Rn, m ∈ Rp. Then the system (2) is ISS
with a linear gain and an exp − KL function with respect
to the bounded sequence {m(k)}, and
|e(k)| ≤ cλk|e(0)|+ γ||m||k, (6)
for all k ≥ 0, e(0) ∈ Rn, and {m(k)} ∈ l∞, where c =√
c2
c1
, λ =
√
1− c3, and γ =
√
µ1
c1
.
III. A CIRCLE-CRITERION OBSERVER ROBUST TO
MEASUREMENT NOISE
In [28], Ibrir designs a discrete-time nonlinear observers
through circle criterion, but no disturbance in the system is
considered. Our goal in this section is to give an extension
of the result given in [28] by taking measurement noise
into consideration and propose a design method of a robust
circle-criterion observer with respect to measurement noise
in the absence of attack signals. The design method uses
a similar idea as the one in [29] by characterizing the
nonlinearity with an incremental multiplier matrix, but we
present an extension of the results given in [29] by solving an
optimization problem with more degrees of freedom, which
leads to a less conservative ISS gain. More specifically, we
show that in some circumstances our circle-criterion observer
provides state estimates less sensitive to measurement noise
(see Example 1). We consider a discrete-time nonlinear
system formulated as:
x+ =Ax+Gf(Hx) + ρ(u, y),
y =Cx+m,
(7)
where x ∈ Rn is the state, y ∈ Rny is the sensor
measurements, m ∈ Rny is the measurement noise with
{m(k)} ∈ l∞ and G ∈ Rn×r, H ∈ Rr×n. The term ρ(u, y)
is a known arbitrary real-valued vector that depends on the
system inputs and outputs.
The state-dependent nonlinearity f(Hx) is an r-
dimensional vector where each entry is a function of a linear
combination of the states
fi = fi

 n∑
j=1
Hijxj

 , i = 1, · · · , r (8)
where Hij are the entries of matrix H .
Assumption 1: For any i ∈ {1, · · · , r}, the following
holds,
fi(vi)− fi(wi)
vi − wi ≥ 0, ∀vi, wi ∈ R with vi 6= wi (9)
We consider a circle-criterion observer with the following
structure:
xˆ+ = Axˆ+Gf(Hxˆ+K(Cxˆ− y)) + L(Cxˆ− y) + ρ(u, y)
(10)
where xˆ denotes the estimate of the state x, and K ∈ Rr×ny ,
and L ∈ Rn×ny are the observer gains to be designed. Then
the error e = xˆ− x has the following dynamics
e+ = (A+ LC)e− Lm+G△f, (11)
where
△f = f(qˆ)− f(q˜), (12)
where q˜ = Hx and qˆ = Hxˆ+K(yˆ − y) and yˆ = Cxˆ
△q = qˆ − q˜ = (H +KC)e−Km. (13)
Our objective is to design the gains K and L, such that a
quadratic Lyapunov function V (e) satisfies (4) and (5). Then
we can show that the error dynamics of the observer is ISS
with a linear gain and an exp − KL function with respect
to the bounded measurement noise and (6) holds.
Proposition 1: Consider system (7), for given c3 ∈ (0, 1),
suppose there exist matrix P ∈ Rn×n and P > 0, K ∈
R
r×ny and Y ∈ Rn×ny , an incremental multiplier matrix
M for the nonlinearity f , and scalars µ > 0 and µ1 > 0 that
satisfy the matrix inequalities:[−P ⋆
Ξ21 Ξ22
]
+
[
0 0
0 ΓTMΓ
]
≤0,
[
P I
I µI
]
≥0,
(14)
where
ΞT21 =
[
PA+ Y C −Y PG] ,
Ξ22 =

(c3 − 1)P 0 00 −c3µ1I 0
0 0 0

 , (15)
and
Γ =
[
H +KC −K 0
0 0 I
]
, (16)
then the observer (10) characterized by gains L = P−1Y
and K has ISS error dynamics with a linear gain γ =
√
µµ1
and an exp−KL function with respect to m.
Proof: The proof of Proposition 1 can be obtained from
the proof of Theorem 1 in [29] by letting H = I , B = 0,
D = I , Dq = 0 and adding a new variable µ1 in Ξ22.
From Proposition 1 , we see that if we could solve (14)
while minimizing
√
µµ1, then the designed observer is robust
to measurement noise. We take advantage of the results in
[29] by using an incremental multiplier matrix to characterize
the nonlinearity f in the design of a robust circle-criterion
observer, but we do not fix µ1 = 1 as a constant as [29] does.
Hence, our observer could provide estimates more robust to
measurement noise in some circumstances.
From (9), we have
(qˆ − q˜)⊤ (f (qˆ)− f(q˜)) ≥ 0. (17)
Recalling (12) and (13), we know △q⊤△f ≥ 0 ∀q˜ ∈ Rr
and ∀qˆ ∈ Rr. Hence, any matrix
M = κ
[
0 1
1 0
]
, (18)
with κ > 0 is an incremental multiplier matrix for f . The
following linear matrix inequality is equivalent to (14).
Lemma 2: [29] For some matrix Y2 ∈ Rr×ny , consider
the linear matrix inequality[−P ⋆
Ξ21 Ξ22
]
+
[
0 0
0 ΓT1MΓ1 + Γ
T
1 Γ2 + Γ
T
2 Γ1
]
≤ 0, (19)
where Ξ21, Ξ22 are described in (15), and Γ1 =[
H 0 0
0 0 I
]
,Γ2 =
[
0 0 0
Y2C −Y2 0
]
, then with
L = P−1Y,K =
Y2
κ
(20)
(19) and (14) are equivalent.
Proof: Recalling (16), we let Γ = Γ1+Γ˜2 where Γ˜2 =[
KC −K 0
0 0 0
]
. Note thatM Γ˜2 =
[
0 0 0
κKC κK 0
]
, with
K given by (20), we see that κK = Y2. Therefore, M Γ˜2 =[
0 0 0
Y2C Y2 0
]
= Γ2. As we have Γ˜
⊤
2 M Γ˜2 = 0, thus
Γ⊤MΓ =(Γ1 + Γ˜2)
⊤M(Γ1 + Γ˜2)
=Γ⊤1 MΓ1 + Γ
⊤
1 M Γ˜2 + Γ˜
⊤
2 MΓ1 + Γ˜
⊤
2 M Γ˜2
=Γ⊤1 MΓ1 + Γ
⊤
1 Γ2 + Γ
⊤
2 Γ1
(21)
which implies that (19) and (14) are equivalent. The proof
is complete.
By replacing (14) with (19) in Proposition 1, we obtain the
following result.
Theorem 1: Consider the system (7), for given c3 ∈ (0, 1),
suppose there exist matrix P ∈ Rn×n and P > 0, matrix
Y ∈ Rn×ny , matrix Y2 ∈ Rr×ny , scalars κ > 0, µ > 0,
µ1 > 0 that satisfy the linear matrix inequalities[−P ⋆
Ξ21 Ξ22
]
+
[
0 0
0 ΓT1MΓ1 + Γ
T
1 Γ2 + Γ
T
2 Γ1
]
≤0,
[
P I
I µI
]
≥0,
(22)
where Ξ21, Ξ22 are described in (15), M is given by (18),
and Γ1 =
[
H 0 0
0 0 I
]
,Γ2 =
[
0 0 0
Y2C −Y2 0
]
, then the
observer (10) characterized by gains given in (20) has ISS
error dynamics with a linear gain γ =
√
µµ1 and an exp−
KL function, which means there exist c > 0, λ ∈ (0, 1) such
that
|e(k)| ≤ cλk|e(0)|+ γ||m||k, (23)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn, k ≥ 0 and m ∈ Rny with {m(k)} ∈ l∞.
Corollary 1: A circle-criterion observer robust to mea-
surement noise can be obtained by solving (22) while mini-
mizing µ+ µ1.
Theorem 1 provides a way to design the observer for
(7). If we solve (22) while minimizing
√
µµ1, we obtain an
observer robust to measurement noise. To make the objective
function convex, we consider using µ + µ1 instead as our
objective function. We know that (µ + µ1)
2 ≥ 4 · µµ1,
which yields γ =
√
µµ1 ≤ 12 (µ+ µ1) as µ, µ1 are positive.
Therefore, we can minimize the upper bounds of γ by
minimizing µ+µ1. By solving (22) while minimizing µ+µ1,
we can obtain an observer that attenuates measurement noise.
Since c3 ∈ (0, 1) is in a bounded set, we do a grid-search
over c3, i.e. we make a grid in (0, 1) and for each grid
point we solve (22) while minimizing µ + µ1 and then
we choose the c3 that minimizes
√
µµ1. In our design
method, besides regarding µ1 as a variable, we also do not
assume c3 is a fixed constant with a given value as [29]
does, which makes our LMIs less conservative than those in
[29] and further improves the robustness of our observer to
measurement noise in some circumstances. We use the model
used in Example 1 in [28] and compare their performance
by introducing measurement noise m. All LMIs were solved
using PENLAB [30] in MATLAB.
Example 1 Consider the discrete-time nonlinear system
subject to measurement noise:
x+ =
[
1 δ
0 1
]
x+
[
1
2δα sin(x1 + x2)
δα sin(x1 + x2)
]
+
[
δu
δu
]
,
y =


3 0.3
3 0.6
6 0.9
1.2 12

x+m.
(24)
We let δ = 0.1 and α = 1. (24) can be rewritten in the form
of (7) with Assumption 1 holding, see [28] for more details.
We solve (22) while minimizing µ + µ1 and doing a grid
search over c3 to obtain observer matrices K , L, c3 = 0.900,
and γ = 0.924. We obtainK , L via solving the LMIs in [28].
We solve the LMIs in [29] by letting c3 = 0.500,M given as
(18), H = I and minimizing µ to obtain observer with γ =
22.4. We let m ∼ U(−0.5, 0.5). x(0) is randomly selected
from a normal distribution and xˆ(0) = 0. The performance
of these observers are compared respectively in Figures 1-2.
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Fig. 1. Estimated states xˆ converges to a neighbourhood of the true states
x. Legend: Observer obtained via Theorem 1 (red), Observer from [29]
(grey), true states (black)
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Fig. 2. Estimated states xˆ converges to a neighbourhood of the true states
x. Legend: Observer obtained via Theorem 1 (red), Observer from [28]
(grey), true states (black)
IV. A CIRCLE-CRITERION OBSERVER-BASED ESTIMATOR
ROBUST TO MEASUREMENT NOISE AND SENSOR ATTACKS
In this section, we introduce a circle-criterion observer-
based estimator for the same class of discrete-time nonlinear
systems as in Section III, but we assume a small number of
sensors are also subject to sensor attacks:
x+ =Ax+Gf(Hx) + ρ(u, y),
y˜ =C˜x+ a+ m˜,
(25)
where x ∈ Rn is the state, y˜ ∈ Rp is the sensor measurement,
m˜ ∈ Rp is the measurement noise with {m˜(k)} ∈ l∞,
a ∈ Rp is the vector of attacks: if sensor i ∈ {1, · · · , p}
is not attacked, then the ith component of the vector
a(k), ai(k) = 0, ∀k ≥ 0; otherwise sensor i is attacked
and ai(k) is arbitrary and possibly unbounded. We denote
W ⊆ {1, · · · , p} the set of attacked sensors, then we have
supp(a) =W . We assume the set W is unknown to us. We
denote y˜
(
k;x(0), a[0,k], m˜[0,k]
)
as the output of the system
at time k when the initial state is x(0) and the outputs are
subject to measurement noise m˜ and sensor attacks a. (8),
(9) still hold.
Suppose some of the sensors are corrupted by at-
tack signals. Having received the measured output se-
quences
{
y˜(k;x(0), a[0,k], m˜[0,k])
} ∀k ≥ 0, a circle-criterion
observer-based estimator is used to estimate the states of the
system. Our objective is to present a design method of a
robust circle-criterion observer-based estimator that provides
exponential convergence of the estimates xˆ(k) to a neighbor-
hood of the true states x(k) under some assumptions, and
the error e(k) = xˆ(k) − x(k) is ISS with a linear gain and
exp − KL function with respect to the measurement noise
only, which means there exist c¯ > 0, λ¯ ∈ (0, 1), γ¯y ≥ 0 such
that,
|e(k)| ≤ c¯λ¯k|e(0)|+ γ¯y||m˜||k, (26)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn, k ≥ 0.
We now outline our estimation strategy which is inspired
by the method for the linear case from [25] . For (25), let
0 < q < p2 be the largest integer such that for each subset
J ⊂ {1, · · · , p} of sensors with card(J) ≥ p−2q, the circle-
criterion observer of the form
xˆ+J =AxˆJ +Gf(HxˆJ +KJ(C˜J xˆJ − y˜J))
+ LJ(C˜J xˆJ − y˜J) + ρ(u, y),
(27)
exists for y˜J . xˆJ denotes the estimate of the state x from
y˜J , and KJ , LJ are the observer gains. C˜J is the stacking
of all C˜i, i ∈ J where C˜i is the ith row of C˜.
When we say the observer exists for y˜J , we mean when
aJ(k) = 0 for all k ≥ 0 the error of each observer eJ(k) =
xˆJ (k)− x(k) with the following dynamics
e+J = (A+ LJ C˜J )eJ − LJm˜J +G△fJ , (28)
where △fJ = f(qˆ) − f(q˜J), q˜ = Hx and qˆJ = HxˆJ +
KJ(yˆJ − y˜J) and yˆJ = C˜J xˆJ , y˜J = C˜Jx+ m˜J is ISS with
a linear gain γJ and an exp−KL function with respect to
measurement noise m˜J . This implies that there exist cJ > 0,
λJ ∈ (0, 1), γJ ≥ 0 such that
|eJ(k)| ≤ cJλkJ |eJ(0)|+ γJ ||m˜J ||k, (29)
for all eJ(0) ∈ Rn, k ≥ 0 and m˜J ∈ Rcard(J) with
{m˜J(k)} ∈ l∞.
We assume that:
Assumption 2: There are at most q sensors attacked,
card(W ) ≤ q. (30)
By using the design method proposed in Section III, we
construct a robust observer for each subset J ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , p}
with card(J) = p − q and for each subset S ⊂ {1, · · · , p}
with card(S) = p− 2q. For each subset J with card(J) =
p−q, we define πJ(k) for all k ≥ 0 to be the largest deviation
between the estimate xˆJ (k) and the estimate xˆS(k) that is
given by any subset S ⊂ J with card(S) = p− 2q.
πJ (k) := max
S⊂J:card(S)=p−2q
|xˆJ(k)− xˆS(k)|. (31)
Recalling that among the total p sensors, there is at least
one subset I¯ ⊂ {1, · · · , p} of sensors with card(I¯) = p− q
that y˜I¯ = CI¯x + m˜I¯ as aI¯ = 0, then in general all of the
estimates that appear in the definition of πI¯(k) are more
consistent than all the subsets J with card(J) = p− q and
y˜J = C˜Jx + aJ + m˜J with aJ 6= 0. This motivates the
following state estimation: for all k ≥ 0,
σ(k) = argmin
J⊂{1,2,··· ,p}:card(J)=p−q
πJ (k), (32)
and then we say for all k ≥ 0, the estimate given by the
subset σ(k) is a good estimate,
xˆ(k) = xˆσ(k)(k), (33)
where xˆσ(k)(k) represents the estimates given by the subset
σ(k). The following result states that the proposed estimator
is robust with respect to sensor attacks and measurement
noise. For simplicity, we initialize all the observers to the
same condition xˆ(0).
Theorem 2: For the system (25), suppose Assumptions 1-
2 hold, recalling from (31)-(33), denoting e(k) = xˆ(k) −
x(k), there exist positive constants c¯ > 0, λ¯ ∈ (0, 1), γ¯y ≥ 0
such that the following inequality holds:
|e(k)| ≤ c¯λ¯k|e(0)|+ γ¯y||m˜||k, (34)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn, k ≥ 0, and m˜ ∈ Rp with {m˜(k)} ∈ l∞.
Proof: From the result of Section III, we know for
each subset J ⊂ {1, · · · , p} with card(J) ≥ p − 2q, the
observation error dynamics satisfies (29). Since ai(k) = 0
for all i ∈ {1, · · · , p} \ supp(a) and ∀k ≥ 0, we conclude
for J = I¯ ⊆ {1, · · · , p} \ supp(a) with card(I¯) = p − q,
there exist cI¯ > 0, λI¯ ∈ (0, 1) and γI¯ ≥ 0, such that
|eI¯(k)| ≤ cI¯λkI¯ |e(0)|+ γI¯ ||m˜I¯ ||k, (35)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0. Also for any set S ⊂ I¯ with
card(S) = p− 2q, we have aS(k) = 0 ∀k ≥ 0, hence there
exist cS > 0, λS ∈ (0, 1) and γS ≥ 0 such that
|eS(k)| ≤ cSλkS |e(0)|+ γS ||m˜S ||k, (36)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0. Recalling the definition of πI¯
from (31), we have that
πI¯(k) =max
S⊂I¯
|xˆI¯(k)− xˆS(k)|
=max
S⊂I¯
|xˆI¯(k)− x(k) + x(k)− xˆS(k)|
≤|eI¯(k)|+max
S⊂I¯
|eS(k)|
(37)
for all k ≥ 0. From (35) and (36), we obtain
πI¯(k) ≤ 2c′I¯λ
′k
I¯
|e(0)|+ 2γ′
I¯
||m˜I¯ ||k, (38)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0, where c′
I¯
:= max
S⊂I¯
{cI¯ , cS},
λ′
I¯
:= max
S⊂I¯
{λI¯ , λS}, and γ′I¯ := max
S⊂I¯
{γI¯ , γS}. Ob-
serve that since S ⊂ I¯ with card(S) = p − 2q. Re-
call from (31)-(33) that xˆ(k) = xˆσ(k)(k) where σ(k) =
argmin
J⊂{1,2,··· ,p}:card(J)=p−q
πJ (k), hence πσ(k)(k) ≤ πI¯(k). We
know that there exist at least one set S¯ ⊂ σ(k) with
card(S¯) = p − 2q such that aS¯(k) = 0 ∀k ≥ 0, and there
exist cS¯ > 0, λS¯ ∈ (0, 1) and γS¯ ≥ 0 such that
|eS¯(k)| ≤ cS¯λkS¯ |e(0)|+ γS¯ ||m˜S¯ ||k, (39)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0. From (31), there is a fact
that πσ(k)(k) = max
S⊂σ(k):card(S)=p−2q
|xˆσ(k)(k) − xˆS(k)| ≥
|xˆσ(k)(k) − xˆS¯(k)|. From the triangle inequality we have
that
|eσ(k)(k)| =|xˆσ(k)(k)− x(k)|
=|xˆσ(k)(k)− xˆS¯(k) + xˆS¯(k)− x(k)|
≤|xˆσ(k)(k)− xˆS¯(k)|+ |eS¯(k)|
≤πσ(k)(k) + |eS¯(k)|
≤πI¯(k) + |eS¯(k)|
(40)
for all k ≥ 0. From (38) and (39), we have
|eσ(k)(k)| ≤ c¯λ¯k|e(0)|+ γ¯y ·max {||m˜S¯ ||k, ||m˜I¯ ||k} , (41)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0, where c¯ = 3 · max{cS¯ , c′I¯},
λ¯ = max
{
λS¯ , λ
′
I¯
}
, γ¯y = 3 ·max
{
γS¯ , γ
′
I¯
}
. Since ||m˜||k ≥
max {||m˜S¯ ||k, ||m˜I¯ ||k}, we can see (41) satisfies (34). The
proof is complete.
We still use the model in Example 1, but here we assume
sensor attacks and measurement noise both occur to test the
performance of our designed estimator.
Example 2 Consider the discrete-time nonlinear system
subject to measurement noise and sensor attacks:
x+ =
[
1 δ
0 1
]
x+
[
1
2δα sin(x1 + x2)
δα sin(x1 + x2)
]
+
[
δu
δu
]
,
y˜ =


3 0.3
3 0.6
6 0.9
1.2 12

x+ a+ m˜.
(42)
We still let δ = 0.1 and α = 1, m˜ ∼ U(−0.5, 0.5). We
find that the circle-criterion observer of the form (27) exists
for each subset of J ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4} with card(J) ≥ 1 and
p = 4, we have q = 1. We let W = {3}, which means the
3-rd sensor is under attack. The estimator knows there is at
most one sensor under attack, but does not know which. By
using the design method proposed in Section III, we design
an observer for each J ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4} with card(J) = 3
and each S ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4} with card(S) = 2. Therefore,
totally
(
4
3
)
+
(
4
2
)
= 10 observers are designed, and they are
all initialized at xˆ(0) = [0, 0]
⊤
. x1(0), x2(0) are randomly
selected from a standard normal distribution. We let a3 ∼
U(−b, b) with b given by 1, 10. For all k ∈ [0, 500], (31)-(33)
is used to construct xˆ(k). The performance of the designed
estimator is shown in Figures 3-4.
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Fig. 3. Estimated states xˆ converges to a neighbourhood of the true states
x when a3 ∼ U(−1, 1). Legend: xˆ (grey), true states (black)
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Fig. 4. Estimated states xˆ converges to a neighbourhood of the true states
x when a3 ∼ U(−10, 10). Legend: xˆ (grey), true states (black)
V. ISOLATION OF SENSOR ATTACKS
In this section, we still consider system (25). We let q be
the largest integer such that a circle-criterion observer exists
for each subset J ⊂ {1, · · · , p} with card(J) ≥ p− 2q. We
propose an algorithm for isolating attacked sensors when we
know how many sensors are attacked, which is denoted as
q⋆ (q⋆ ≤ q).
Assumption 3: There are q⋆ ≤ q attacked sensors, i.e.,
card(W ) = q⋆, (43)
and q⋆ ≤ q is a known positive integer.
We construct a circle-criterion observer for each subset J ⊂
{1, · · · , p) with card(J) = p− q⋆ and for each subset S ⊂
{1, · · · , p} with card(S) = p− 2q⋆. For each subset J with
card(J) = p− q⋆ and for all k ≥ 0, we define π⋆J (k) as
π⋆J (k) := max
S⊂J:card(S)=p−2q⋆
|xˆJ (k)− xˆS(k)|. (44)
Since there are q⋆ sensors under attack, we know there is
one subset I¯ ⊂ {1, · · · , p} of sensors with card(I¯) = p− q⋆
that y˜I¯ = C˜I¯x+ m˜I¯ as aI¯ = 0, then all of the estimates that
appear in the definition of πI¯(k) are very likely to be more
consistent than all the subsets J with card(J) = p− q⋆ and
y˜J = C˜Jx + aJ + m˜J with aJ 6= 0. For all k > 0, if we
denote J¯(k) as the set of attack-free sensors at time k, then
J¯(k) is given as
J¯(k) = argmin
J⊂{1,2,··· ,p}:card(J)=p−q⋆
πJ (k). (45)
Then the set {1, · · · , p} \ J¯(k) is isolated as the set of
attacked sensors at time k. We make our decision in every
N time steps, where N ∈ Z>0 is the window size we
choose, i.e. in each N time steps we keep obtaining J¯(k)
from (45) for each k, and we choose the subset J(i) that is
equal to J¯(k) most often in the i-th window. Then we claim
{1, · · · , p}\J(i) is the set of sensors potentially under attack
in the i-th time window, which is Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 SENSOR ATTACKS ISOLATION Input: N ,
q⋆
1: Design a circle-criterion observer for each subset
J ⊂ {1, · · · , p} with card(J) = p− q⋆ and for each
subset S ⊂ {1, · · · , p} with card(S) = p− 2q⋆ .
2: We intialize the counter variable nJ(i) = 0 for each J
with card(J) = p− q⋆ and for all i ∈ Z>0.
3: for each i ∈ Z>0 do
4: for each k ∈ [1 + (i − 1)N, iN ] do
5: calculate π⋆J (k) for all J with card(J) = p− q⋆
as follows:
π⋆J (k) = max
S⊂J:card(S)=p−2q⋆
|xˆJ (k)− xˆS(k)|.
6: Select the subset J¯(k) such that
J¯(k) = argmin
J⊂{1,2,··· ,p}:card(J)=p−q⋆
πJ (k).
7: if for some J with card(J) = p − q⋆ we have
J¯(k) == J then
8: update nJ(i) as follows:
nJ(i) = nJ(i) + 1.
9: end if
10: end for
11: Select the subset J that is equal to J¯(k) most often
J(i) = argmax
J∈{1,··· ,p}:card(J)=p−q⋆
nJ(i).
12: The set of sensors potentially under attack is given as:
A˜(i) = {1, · · · , p} \ J(i).
13: Return A˜(i).
14: end for
Example 3 We still consider model (42) in Example 2,
with δ = 0.1. We consider two cases where α is equal to 1
and 0 respectively. In each case, we let m˜ ∼ U(−0.5, 0.5),
q⋆ = 1 and W = {3}. We let a3 ∼ U(−b, b), and b given
by 1, 2.5. In each case, we choose the window size N to be
50, 100, 200 respectively.
Case 1. α = 1, we apply Algorithm 1 by running
(
4
2
)
+(
4
3
)
= 10 circle-criterion observers which are all initialized
with xˆ(0) = [0, 0]
⊤
and x1(0), x2(0) are randomly selected
from a standard normal distribution. We follow the steps in
Algorithm 1. We check in 1000 time steps which sensor is
isolated in each time window, which is shown in Figures 5-
6.
Case 2. α = 0, (42) becomes a discrete-time linear sys-
tems subject to measurement noise and sensor attacks. We
construct observers via solving (22) by letting G = 0 and
minimizing µ+ µ1. We apply Algorithm 1 in a similar way
as what we do when α = 1 and Figures 7-8 show the
performance of Algorithm 1 when α = 0.
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Fig. 5. The sensor isolated by Algorithm 1, α = 1, a3 ∼ U(−1, 1).
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Fig. 6. The sensor isolated by Algorithm 1, α = 1, a3 ∼ U(−2.5, 2.5).
The major advantage of Algorithm 1 is that it can be
applied to isolate attacked sensors when sensor attacks and
measurement noise both occur as long as measurement noise
is bounded.
VI. CONCLUSION
Following the way of [29], a design method of a discrete-
time circle-criterion observer robust to measurement noise is
given as a series of linear matrix inequalities in the absence
of attack signals. An less conservative ISS gain is obtained
by solving an optimization problem with more degrees of
freedom. Then a circle-criterion observer-based estimation
strategy is proposed in the presence of measurement noise
and sensor attacks. We show that the designed circle-criterion
observer-based estimator provides ISS estimation errors with
a linear gain and an exp−KL function with respect to mea-
surement noise when a sufficiently small subset of sensors
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Fig. 7. The sensor isolated by Algorithm 1, α = 0, a3 ∼ U(−1, 1).
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Fig. 8. The sensor isolated by Algorithm 1, α = 0, a3 ∼ U(−2.5, 2.5).
are corrupted by (potentially unbounded) attack signals and
all sensors are affected by bounded measurement noise. This
work can be seen as an extension of the existing observer-
based estimator for linear systems [25]. An algorithm for
isolating attacked sensors is also proposed when we know
how many sensors are attacked.
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